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LEAD US NOT INTO PENN STATION:
TAKINGS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND
RENT CONTROL
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL*
J am going to discuss the double issue of rent control and historic
preservation, or landmarks preservation. In titling my remarks, I
had in mind the humorous way that children saying the Lord's Prayer
confuse "lead us not into temptation" with "lead us not into Penn
Station." I decided to take this double meaning to refer to the origin
of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law,' which was occa-
sioned by the 1964 demolition of the original Pennsylvania Station in
New York City. New York's ordinance subsequently swept the coun-
try as a model for landmarks preservation.
I am also going to make the reference to the "temptation" of using
regulation to achieve goals that should be better accomplished by de-
liberate eminent domain proceedings, or at least with some form of
indirect compensation. I believe, by the way, that the owners of
Grand Central Terminal, the subject of the Supreme Court decision,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,2 in fact, received
just compensation. It was not technically "just compensation," be-
cause payment was not made in money, but Penn Central was offered
transferrable development rights, which turned out to be quite valua-
ble, and so this decision does not offend my sense of justice.
I also want to give a pitch for my book, Regulatory Takings: Law,
Economics and Politics, which Harvard University Press will publish
in July of this year. I want to talk about the two major themes of that
book, and then apply them to rent control and landmarks
preservation.
The two major themes of the book are fairness and the capacity for
judicial review. I believe, having surveyed a large amount of takings
territory, including eminent domain cases, constitutional conventions,
and modern economic theory, that just compensation boils down to a
question of fair treatment by the government. Although that is an
unexciting proposition, it has important implications. Many economic
analyses of the takings issue conclude that it is about economic effi-
ciency. But I don't think takings are about economic efficiency.
Rather, I think they are about fairness. Paying additional attention to
takings-taking them a little more seriously-would probably make
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1. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-301 to -321 (1992).
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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for a somewhat more efficient state of the world, but that's not the
reason that the judges should invoke the Takings Clause.
This, of course, borrows from Professor Frank Michelman's 1967
Harvard Law Review classic survey of the territory, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law.3 I commend it to you as a classy, intelligent Article, and
I build on it. I should say that Professor Michelman does not neces-
sarily agree with what I have to say. Indeed, it seems to me that
Michelman wrote this classic Article more than twenty-five years ago,
and, ever since then, has been defending himself against his admirers.
I think it is a great Article and I want to take it somewhere, and Frank
keeps backpedaling a little bit here and there, I think.
The other theme that I examine in my book is the limitations of
judicial review under the Constitution. This is a problematic enter-
prise. The judges are both limited in their capacity and their legiti-
macy to review matters of property rights. The Constitution, while
containing references to property, does not define property, and it is
clearly a document for self-government by people. So, what those of
us who think takings is an important issue really want to ask ourselves
is this: where should judges deploy their scarce political capital, given
that they can not do everything they want to do?
My view is that property is usually protected from excess regulation
by two possibilities-"exit" and "voice." They come from Albert
Hirschman's classic book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.4 Judges do not
have to be concerned about property when it can exit from the juris-
diction. I mean "exit" in a very broad sense of elastic supply, if you
like your economics definitions, or as the ability to withhold resources
or to remove them from the threat of regulation. Exit is taken very
seriously by government officials, and in my book I give many exam-
ples of it.
My casual example is the City of Berkeley, where I lived several
years ago. Berkeley has very stringent regulations on apartments and
on the development of property, all in the interest of promoting the
well-being of the poor. That is to say that Berkeley is interested in
keeping rents down to help the poor. However, Berkeley does not
regulate the price of food. There is a simple reason why Berkeley
does not regulate the price of food-there would be no food supply if
regulations kept the price too low.
In fact, since the food industry is a highly competitive one, any price
regulation on food would probably cut off supplies within the City of
Berkeley very quickly, and that disciplines the otherwise pro-regula-
3. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
4. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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tory City Council. I do not think that the California Supreme Court
needs to protect Berkeley's food store owners.
The second protection from excessive regulation is that of "voice,"
by which Hirschman meant a general ability to participate in and in-
fluence the political process. Interest groups, bicameralism, and other
features of the federal government are excellent ways of providing
voice. If you read The Federalist Number Ten5 a little more carefully
than many of my colleagues do, you will see that James Madison was
really a structuralist. Madison favored large republics because they
offer the opportunity for people to protect themselves by participating
in the polity. They do this to guard against the arbitrary results of
majoritarian sentiments.
So, if exit and voice work so well, why should judges do anything for
property? The answer is that there are two areas where exit and voice
do not work very well. Exit does not work where the asset being regu-
lated is immovable or otherwise inelastic in supply, as economists like
to say. The paradigm of that, of course, is land. That is why the gov-
ernment could tax land up to 100 percent of its value, as Henry
George urged.6 Economists actually favor this kind of tax because it
is efficient. But because land cannot exit, being immovable, it is also
vulnerable to excessive regulation.
The other aspect that makes land somewhat more vulnerable than
other types of property is that voice is ineffective in some government
structures because the individuals who are adversely affected by the
regulation live outside the jurisdiction. Here, of course, I am referring
to local government land-use regulation. So, the paradigm case for
where judges should spend some of their scarce constitutional capital
is suburban growth controls. These will not be discussed here. Robert
Ellickson reviewed suburban growth controls some time ago in the
Yale Law Journal,7 if you care to look at what I believe to be the
correct standard.
Instead, I will examine rent control and landmarks preservation to
determine how they fit my model of where judges should intervene.
Moreover, I will discuss the kinds of structures that are protective of
landowners, and where the protections might fail.
To a large extent, rent control and landmarks preservation confirm
my voice model at the state and national level. There is scarcely any
statewide rent control. It is almost exclusively local. There has been
only one instance of national rent control in peacetime, Richard
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
6. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Robert Schalkenbach Founda-
tion 1955). George argued that "the whole value of land may be taken in taxation,
and the only effect will be to stimulate industry ... and to increase the production of
wealth." Id. at 414.
7. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
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Nixon's 1971 general wage and price controls.8 These controls quickly
became extremely unpopular, and after a while the entire regulatory
scheme was eliminated by the political process. So, landowners have
protection at the state and national level in this area.
Landmarks preservation is undertaken by the federal government,
but typically in a way that is procedurally more protective of property
owners. Furthermore, the federal government offers indirect compen-
sation for preservation in the form of tax breaks and subsidies for
maintenance, which mitigate its burdens, even if they do not alleviate
them entirely.
Rent control is undertaken almost entirely at the local level. The
issue that I would like to address regarding rent control is not why we
have rent control at all, but rather why we do not have more rent
control. Rent control seems like a good way for a majoritarian gov-
ernment to give benefits to a large group of tenants at the expense of
an unloved, probably unrepresented group of landlords at the local
level.
However, landlords have one important political protection at the
local level. In a world in which there are property taxes, homeowners
begin to realize that rent control diminishes the value of apartment
buildings, which will cause more of the property tax burden to fall on
owner-occupied homes. Therefore, the reason why rent control is rel-
atively rare in the United States is partly that homeowners are usually
a majority and are concerned about their share of the property taxes,
and because homeowners do not like to see deteriorated buildings and
other consequences that sometimes result from stringent rent controls.
As a result of these political and economic considerations, we see
rent control in its severe form only where renters are a large majority
of the population (i.e., New York City and Washington, D.C.), and in
states, like California, where homeowners' property taxes are kept at
a very low level.9 In most other cities, rent control is relatively moder-
ate, and partly for that reason economists have a rather difficult time
gathering statistically reliable evidence that rent control has all of the
dire effects that they claim it does. For example, economists predict
that if rental prices are held below equilibrium, an extreme shortage
of apartments will result. Nobody will want to be a landlord, and
therefore tenants will be worse off. But, these lessons have actually
8. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971), revoked, Exec. Order No. 11,695,
3A C.F.R. 150 (1973).
9. California has unusually low property taxes because of Proposition 13, a voter
initiative that was passed in 1978. Proposition 13 imposed a statewide maximum tax
rate of one percent and substantially retarded the amount that assessed values could
increase as a result of inflation. Property tax revenues fell to less than half of what
they had been previously. See generally ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY
TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995). Proposition 13
was said to have triggered rent control because tenants did not receive as large a
windfall from property tax reductions as they had been promised.
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been learned in an intuitive sense by the controllers of rent. As a
result, the dire predictions of economists do not come true. Politicians
intuitively believe the predictions and do not permit rent control to
become too severe in most jurisdictions.
Thus, in most jurisdictions, rent control generally gets exit and voice
protection. However, there are several relatively rare instances where
exit and voice do not work, and judges have to spend some of their
political capital.
Now, let me turn to landmarks preservation. Unlike rent control,
landmarks preservation can have compensation in the form of reci-
procity. This reciprocity is most obvious when entire neighborhoods
are designated landmarks or are subject to historic preservation regu-
lations. In such instances, the political voice of the neighborhood is
important. There is an imposition of a regulatory cost, but there is
also the conferral of a benefit. Since the benefit and the cost are
roughly the same, neighborhood landmarks preservation and historic
preservation are surely not areas that judges should spend a lot of
time on.
But, what about the isolated landmark? Here we have a problem
with reciprocity. A landmark is a building that provides something
that almost all of us would characterize as a public benefit. Having an
ordinary building is not regarded as a harmful thing. But consider the
building owner who hired a famous architect, or built a nice building,
and thus benefitted the public. Individual landmark designation im-
poses a special burden on this owner.
I think this imposition is unfair, and I think that most of the
progenitors of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law thought
it was unfair, too. That is why they offered transferrable development
rights. It is also why the Costonis Plan for Chicago,' ° now all but for-
gotten, was a very good idea. In fairness, building owners have cre-
ated a public benefit, and the public should give them something in
exchange for maintaining their good behavior into the future.
There are, however, some landmarks preservation laws that have
gone too far, an example of which is the Philadelphia Historic Build-
ings, Structures, Sites, Objects, and Districts Ordinance." I say this
guardedly because I do not know the law very well. I only know it
from the Boyd Theater case.' 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
got it right. In effect, the court interpreted the Philadelphia
landmarks law as a benefit extraction, which requires compensation
under traditional eminent domain laws. But then the Court got it
wrong and reversed itself after rehearing the case.
10. John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972).
11. PHILADELPHIA, PA., PHILADELPHIA CODE, § 14-2007(1)-(8) (1989).
12. United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa.
1991), rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court got it wrong because there appar-
ently was no transferrable development right. Therefore, there was
no reciprocity. Essentially, the owners of the Boyd Theater were told,
"You've got a nice-looking theater. We've enjoyed it for years and we
want to keep on enjoying it for years, and it's your dime, not ours."
This is a case where the exit and voice option has been attenuated
enough that judges should spend some of their scarce political capital
to help the property owner.
There is one other thing that might discipline landmarks preserva-
tion laws in the long run. It is the possibility that because sometime in
the future a building might be designated a landmark or otherwise
subjected to uncompensated regulation, landlords will begin hiring
mediocre architects or asking good architects to design mediocre
buildings that will not be landmarked.
Now, this idea struck me as a little bit far-fetched. I do not know
much about architects and architecture, but a few years ago, I came
across a column by The New York Times architectural critic, Paul
Goldberger. Goldberger is a proponent of historic preservation, but
he concluded his column with a caveat, indicating a concern about
what landmarking says about the future. He wrote that "[a] city
evolves over time and the city that contains not enough new buildings
is as robbed of the reality of time as the one that contains not enough
old ones."'13 Therefore, Goldberger is concerned a little bit about the
future.
In summary, I think judicial application of the regulatory takings
doctrine should help the property owner. By assuring that a well-
designed building will not become a burden to its owner in the future,
compensation would promote the design of attractive structures in the
present. I realize that transferrable development rights are not formal
compensation. I know that eminent domain law requires monetary
compensation. Nonetheless, our sense of fairness is satisfied when we
give owners something in return. Since fairness is what this regulatory
takings issue is all about, transferrable development rights are a satis-
factory solution, as long as the development rights are not trivial ones.
The temptation to be guarded against is the Philadelphia scheme,
which offers no reciprocity.
13. Paul Goldberger, A Commission That Has Itself Become a Landmark, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1990, § 2, at 36.
